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Abstract 
 
We describe three mechanisms—consolidation, refreshing, and removal—defined in 
several theoretical reviews in a recent Ann NY Acad Sci special issue as processes that 
may serve to strengthen new memories. We detail their explicit and implied differences 
and similarities, and highlight points upon which theorists disagree about their 
supposed characteristics. We consider the challenges remaining in refining definitions 
of these processes and with situating them within working memory theories, and 
consider how these process definitions and theory should restrict each other. 
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Three distinct maintenance processes have been proposed in recent years to assist 
maintenance in working memory, the limited-capacity system for mentally holding 
information in readiness for imminent use. Consolidation serves to stabilize novel 
information; refreshing boosts activation of information, preventing its otherwise 
inevitable loss; removal de-activates information that was once activated in working 
memory, freeing limited resources for activating different information. For the first 
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time, teams of scholars who study working memory have attempted to comprehensively 
and consistently define these concepts in several theoretical articles featured in a recent 
special issue of Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, products of a symposium 
that also produced other, empirically-oriented articles on these maintenance processes.1 
After the symposium, lingering disagreements on the definitions remain substantial 
among the theoretical articles, as we would expect given that consolidation and removal 
have not been discussed much in this field until fairly recently. Uncovering these 
disagreements and making them explicit allows researchers to better understand where 
the gaps in our collective thinking lie. In the theoretical articles, points of remaining 
disagreement about each concept are delineated. Our aim here is to consider these 
proposed processes together, highlight their commonalities and discrepancies, and 
situate them within models of working memory in a way that might motivate future 
research. We do so with special reference to the three special issue review articles on the 
concepts of consolidation1, refreshing2, and removal3. 
  Each process, as applied to working memory, is imagined to operate on 
representations in which an item is bound to its context (e.g., spatial location, serial 
position), or perhaps when novel perceptions must be more firmly established by 
linking them to long-term knowledge2. The processes could differ as to when they are 
initiated, how long they take to complete, whether they monopolize attention, and 
whether they are under conscious control. However, because there remains substantial 
disagreement within each concept’s definition, it remains unclear how distinct these 
processes are. Furthermore, the processes’ definitions sometimes depend on underlying 
                                                        
1 Ann NY Acad Sci XXXX: XX-XX (2018) 
 3 
theory on which disagreement remains, (e.g., are maintenance-supporting functions 
needed because information would decay otherwise4 or in order to prevent 
interference?5). We shall make two pair-wise comparisons—between consolidation and 
refreshing, and between refreshing and removal—to further explore similarities and 
differences between the processes. Ultimately, we think that the definitions are still 
works in progress that do not always perfectly distinguish one process from another, yet 
we hope that this exercise will help to focus new research aimed at clarifying how we 
remember.   
 Though naturally many tasks are used to measure maintenance enhancement 
processes, we shall illustrate similarities and differences between the processes via the 
complex working memory span paradigm, because it has been used to measure each 
process, is thought to index individual differences in working memory well, and 
provides ample opportunity for the operation of the three processes to be observed. In a 
complex span task, participants are given a sequence of items to remember, interleaved 
with attention-demanding choice judgments. Making these discriminations is believed 
to require attention, thereby starving any other process of attentional resources. For 
instance, in a typical complex span task participants might be given a word to 
remember, then asked to discriminate whether a sentence is veridical or not, then given 
another word to remember, then another sentence to judge, and so forth. There can be 
multiple processing episodes or a single episode between each two memoranda. After a 
sequence of 2-8 to-be-remembered item presentations and processing judgments, 
participants attempt to recall the items in serial order. Maintenance enhancement 
processes of some kind may be inferred from performance on this task in several ways: 
by measuring how much is remembered as a function of the time provided to perform 
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the discrimination judgments6, by measuring how long it takes to perform the 
discrimination judgments as a function of how many items are currently maintained7–11, 
by measuring memory performance as a function of the amount of time inserted 
between each trial12.  
The purpose of complex span procedures originally was to ensure that both 
storage and processing aspects of working memory were engaged because capacity 
during processing was considered to reflect how working memory is used in real-life 
activities such as reading and math13,14. As evidence grew indicating that processing and 
storage may share general, attentional resources15, another goal was to use the 
processing task to control the amount of attention available for mnemonic activities16,17 
and to observe the effect of mnemonic activities on processing7,18. We shall turn to 
evidence from tasks like this as we compare definitions of each maintenance process 
and the procedures for manipulating and measuring them, because considering the 
maintenance processes within a specific task context elucidates the lingering 
ambiguities that still prevent us from establishing distinct operational definitions of 
each process. Ultimately, we think that refining the definitions of these processes 
benefits greatly from considering two (or more) of them jointly within the same 
experimental designs6,12,19. 
 
Consolidation and refreshing 
The operational definitions of consolidation and refreshing are remarkably similar even 
though their raisons d’être differ. Both are meant to be applied to a wide range of 
stimulus types, unlike verbal rehearsal, which applies only to verbalizable information 
and seems to be differentially affected by manipulations that limit articulation20. 
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Conceptually, consolidation and refreshing seem like they could be distinct, in that 
consolidation firms up new, unstable perceptual representations while refreshing 
prevents the loss of information already more persistently established in mind. Indeed, 
consolidation has been invoked to explain phenomena that would not be attributable to 
refreshing, such as identification of targets in attentional blink paradigms21. Both 
processes are generally believed to be intensive: being engaged in consolidation 
prevents encoding of incoming information22 and similarly, it is assumed that refreshing 
cannot occur effectively during another attentive process1. One could think of 
consolidation and refreshing as a two-stage process, by which information must be 
consolidated to some degree in working memory before it could be eligible for 
refreshing. However, consolidation and refreshing in working memory are usually 
operationalized in exactly the same way: by varying the amount of uninterrupted time 
inserted after some key trial event. Crucially, to measure consolidation this 
uninterrupted time should occur immediately after the to-be-remembered information, 
whereas to measure refreshing, the free time may occur at any point after the to-be-
remembered information has been presented, until the to-be-remembered information 
is forgotten beyond recovery, including immediately after presentation of a memory 
item. Distinguishing whether refreshing and consolidation could be distinct therefore 
depends on separately evaluating the effects of imposing free time at these various 
moments after presentation of a memory item. They could be independent processes or 
they could be reciprocal in the sense that as more consolidation occurs, the rate of 
memory loss becomes slower and less refreshing is necessary to preserve the 
representation23,24.  
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Evidence indeed suggests that the free time inserted immediately in between 
presentation of the memory item and presentation of the to-be-processed item is 
special. Bayliss, Bogdanovs, and Jarrold19 varied the amount of free time in this interval, 
while keeping total time constant by manipulating whether a long interval was placed 
before or after the to-be-processed stimulus. They also manipulated the cognitive load of 
the subsequent processing task in order to independently vary the effectiveness of 
attentional refreshing that occurred later during retention. They consistently observed 
effects of placement of the processing task, such that allowing more uninterrupted time 
immediately after the memory item improved recall, and they also found better recall 
with the easier processing task. These factors did not interact, which suggests that the 
manipulations of processing placement and cognitive load affected different processes. 
De Schrijver and Barrouillet6 similarly compared effects of the duration of free time 
provided immediately after presentation of the memory item with effects of the 
cognitive load of the processing task, and likewise found that these effects typically did 
not interact; they only observed an interaction when they included a condition in which 
no time was allowed for consolidation, presumably because in this condition, so much of 
the list was forgotten under high cognitive load. That manipulations of the duration and 
position of free time consistently do not interact supports the idea that even if the 
processes are quite similar, consolidation of novel information may differ from the 
process used to enhance maintenance of stable representations.  
The complementary results from these two studies6,19 suggest that disrupting the 
use of free time and the temporal position of free time both affect recall performance, 
presumably because the manipulations independently affect only one of the 
maintenance-enhancing processes. While this is plausible, it also remains possible that 
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one process, performed at different moments, has different impact. The latest thinking 
on consolidation and refreshing, as reflected in this volume, identifies only the temporal 
placement of the process with respect to encoding of the memoranda as a unique way to 
operationally differentiate between consolidation and refreshing. Another possible 
difference is the time the process requires to be adequately performed: refreshing is 
believed to occur quite rapidly, on the order of tens of milliseconds, whereas 
consolidation is believed to require at least 500 ms, and likely longer. However, even 
this point remains unclear because of suggestions that there are two kinds of refreshing, 
a quick process and a slow process2, and others note that consolidation and refreshing 
could be interchangeable with each other, accomplishing the same purpose6, or inter-
dependent, such that the quality of consolidation affects the progress of subsequent 
maintenance processes23,24. Since the theoretical descriptions of consolidation and 
refreshing are so similar, presumably the two processes may enhance memory in similar 
ways, begging us to question whether we are truly describing distinct processes, 
particularly consolidation and a hypothetical slow refreshing operation.  
One advantage of distinguishing between consolidation, which must occur to a 
certain extent before the information can be recalled, and a post-consolidation 
strengthening process like refreshing is that the distinction could help to better explain 
why for some stimulus types, little or no effects of cognitive load during retention are 
observed. These effects have been taken to mean that refreshing is not happening with 
some stimuli, leading to claims that some materials (e.g., unfamiliar visual characters25 
or fonts7) cannot be refreshed. Perhaps instead, unfamiliar information requires more 
time or exposure to be sufficiently consolidated26, and poorly consolidated information 
of any sort cannot be refreshed. In any case, it is unclear from the currently available 
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evidence whether so-called “unrefreshable” representations were ever sufficiently 
consolidated; one might instead suggest they are “unconsolidateable”, except that 
presumably, anything was at some point so novel and unfamiliar to any individual that 
it could not be absorbed quickly. This vision of the two processes (or acknowledgement 
of the distinct timescales at which maintenance enhancement must operate) seems to us 
superior to limiting refreshing by declaring that it can only occur for certain stimulus 
types (while also maintaining that it is nonetheless a general, rather than a domain-
specific, process2,4). One could also still suggest that a single enhancement process is in 
effect, but that it is particularly necessary to be applied immediately after encoding for 
unfamiliar items. 
It might be possible to achieve more clarity by considering multiple traits of the 
attentional system27,28. Attention always implies that one mental activity takes place at 
the expense of another potential activity, but not all attended activities are voluntary; 
sometimes, an obligatory activity captures attention. It is possible that some degree of 
consolidation is obligatory and determined by stimulus events (such as the amount of 
free time available following the stimulus29) but prevents other mnemonic uses of 
attention until it is completed. By analogy, one must catch a ball before one can choose 
what else to do with it (e.g., throw it in the air or bounce it). 
 
Refreshing and removal 
A methodological difficulty in dual-task procedures is that the effect of one task on 
another can be attributed either to a limitation in available resources shared between 
the two tasks, or to interference from the stimulus materials of one task on the memory 
representations needed in the second task. Whereas the consolidation and refreshing 
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hypotheses presuppose a limited resource, the alternative supposition that there is 
interference between task materials leads to the removal hypothesis, the notion that 
attention is needed to prevent processing materials from intruding into the episodic 
representation of the memoranda. Like consolidation and refreshing, removal is 
manipulated by altering the duration and position of free time within the confines of a 
working memory task. For removal to occur, free time must be available at any time 
after presentation of the information that needs to be removed. In the complex span 
paradigm, to-be-processed distractors that are confusable with the memory items are 
plausible targets for removal. Oberauer and Lewandowsky12 tested whether assuming 
removal of processing task content, rather than refreshing of memoranda, accounted for 
superior recall in the complex span paradigm. By using words as both memoranda and 
distractors, it was possible to observe the rates at which distractors intruded into recall 
(and thus were definitely not removed from working memory). They manipulated the 
time following each processing episode, assuming that more time would correspond to 
more complete removal, and therefore better recall of memoranda, including fewer 
distractor-word intrusions. Indeed, with more time after the distractors, memory 
performance improved. This improvement could not be attributed to refreshing as well 
as removal because with less time after distractors, participants erroneously recalled 
more of the distractors despite having less time to refresh the memoranda or the 
distractors. Moreover, Oberauer and Lewandowsky further showed that increased time 
following distractors improved memory recall and reduced distractor intrusions even in 
a paradigm in which all of the processing episodes were presented before any of the 
memoranda. In that case, the time could not be used to consolidate or refresh the 
memoranda; any maintenance operations performed during the free time could only 
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have been performed on the processed distractors. This cleverly demonstrates a 
distinction between time being used to diminish no-longer-relevant as opposed to 
boosting still-relevant information. 
It is important to point out that distractor removal probably cannot completely 
replace both consolidation and refreshing as mnemonic mechanisms (see, e.g., 30,31). 
Oberauer and Lewandowsky12 used distractors that were similar to the verbal items to 
be remembered, allowing intrusions, and found little additional interference when they 
interposed a spatial task between distractors (attributed to interference with the 
removal process itself). Removal probably cannot explain why there is a decline in 
performance when the only distraction task consists of that same spatial task 
interpolated between verbal items to be remembered, that is, when there is nothing 
confusable with the memoranda that would need to be removed from the representation 
to counteract interference. It is therefore probable that at least one of the other two 
proposed processes must be invoked in addition to a removal process to produce a 
comprehensive account of maintenance in working memory.  
 Demonstrating that removal of information from working memory occurs thus 
does not disprove that other maintenance-enhancement processes do not also occur. 
But it certainly complicates detection and measurement of the use of any one process, 
because free time within a complex span trial may enhance memory via any of three 
plausible processes. If we accept that consolidation must occur immediately after 
encoding, then later free time prior to recall might reflect either refreshing of the 
current memoranda or removal of distractors or previous memoranda in the typical 
administration of a complex span task. Without building in any means to distinguish 
these processes, one cannot know which one may have occurred to improve recall. This 
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is unfortunately still the case for many studies purporting to explore maintenance 
processes in working memory: their characteristics are currently so similar that we 
cannot be sure which one(s) was(were) affected by the experimental manipulation. It is 
therefore increasingly important, as we move forward, that attempts to detect one of 
these processes at work acknowledge the other processes, and that researchers take care 
to limit their measurements in ways that allow isolation of the process under 
investigation. The studies we highlighted6,12,19 show that this is possible, but the effort 
would be further assisted by clearer differentiation between processes that goes beyond 
their timing limitations. Refreshing and removal can occur during the same periods, and 
consolidation may also, if consolidation resumes after an interruption, one of the points 
that remains undecided1. Without further clarity on the characteristics of these 
processes, we fear that what is being measured in many experimental tests will remain 
ambiguous. 
 
Consolidation, refreshing, and removal in models of working memory 
The similarities between the processes—that they occur to generally enhance memory of 
both verbal and visual materials, that they require or at least benefit from undivided 
attention—situate them so that they must be assumed to rely on the general attentional 
components of working memory models. The time-based resource sharing (TBRS) 
model explicitly posits an executive loop that integrates disparate representations and 
strengthens these activations with periodic refreshing4. This differs from Baddeley’s32 
vision of a central executive that processes information in that the TBRS model 
supposes that this central component both stores and attends to information, while the 
central executive of Baddeley’s model does not include maintenance. (Baddeley and 
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Hitch33 did include a central storage component but Baddeley later removed it from his 
model.) Similarly, the three processes must be assumed to engage the focus of attention 
in embedded process models of working memory34,35, which temporarily activates a 
subset of the entire memory system. The convergence of approaches can be seen with 
recent studies of the focus of attention as a storage device by Baddeley, Hitch, and 
colleagues36,37.  
 Integrating consolidation into working memory models is, we believe, the most 
challenging idea that arises from distinguishing between these maintenance processes. 
The notion of consolidation as a specific working memory process that requires 
attention and is distinguished from consolidation in long-term memory challenges the 
notion of passive (or peripheral) short-term storage as is widely presumed, and 
explicitly posited by the multi-component working memory model32 and included 
alongside active maintenance in the most recent iteration of the TBRS4 model. If novel 
information may be encoded and held in a passive short-term buffer without 
involvement of attention, it is unclear what role consolidation would play in maintaining 
or strengthening such representations. In the TBRS framework, which includes both 
passive short-term buffers and active maintenance, perhaps only memoranda that had 
been actively maintained would be eligible for consolidation. However, in the traditional 
multiple-component model, where no short-term storage necessarily involves attention, 
it is less clear how an attention-dependent consolidation process fits in. We know that 
passively holding information in mind for some period does not in and of itself 
strengthen a memory and render it more retrievable later38. If we are committed to 
incorporating the notion of consolidation into models of working memory, we must 
refine ideas about storage to accommodate it, or delineate circumstances under which 
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consolidation may not proceed, to avoid contradiction. What was once considered short-
term storage may be considered to be sensory representation, “maintained” by its use in 
an ongoing procedure39. Assuming that fleeting representations are not consolidated, 
but persist via ongoing actions could be one way of preserving the idea that novel 
information may be briefly represented without undergoing the consolidation that 
would stabilize the representation. Moreover, though each process was presumed to 
require attention, their attentional demand may still differ: consolidation may be 
obligatory and may occur involuntarily, in contrast to refreshing and removal, which are 
assumed to occur voluntarily. 
 It is also possible that while carrying out one process, another is achieved as an 
added benefit. Cowan40,41 proposed that the process of using attention to search through 
a list to determine which item to recall next in serial recall accomplishes a kind of 
refreshment of the memory, explaining why better recall does not have to mean faster 
recall and faster recall does not have to mean better recall42.  Similarly, it is possible that 
refreshing accomplishes a sort of list-wide consolidation in which the stability of the 
representation has to do with the serial relation between items in the list43. 
The process of psychological theory building transcends borders, institutions, 
and laboratories, and is freely creative and unrestrained. Exercises like this one, in 
which many researchers join together to attempt to agree on definitions of the 
phenomena they study are vital because they allow us to see what, if any, common 
assumptions may constrain theory development. Identifying these crucial constraints is 
needed for consensus and progress with theory construction, so that over time we 
progress toward a more correct and complete vision. Without increasing constraint, we 
risk engaging in purely semantic exercises in which we talk about the same phenomena 
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using different words, arguing about nothing. This exercise in defining processes 
involved in working memory maintenance leaves us with more certain knowledge about 
what we believe, and also what we do not know, which is just as important in a young 
scientific field such as psychology. Three processes, consolidation, refreshing, and 
removal, apparently operate at different times with respect to the encoding of 
memoranda. In many other respects, these processes seem very similar. Knowing this 
affords us the opportunity to consider how else they may differ, so that we can continue 
considering whether and how these processes are unique, and whether they differ in 
how they fit with assumptions about the architecture of a working memory system. In 
our view, the current definitions of these processes are works in progress that, so far, 
only offer limited possibilities for comparing and further constraining models of 
working memory. We think it is nonetheless important to have explicitly stated 
definitions of these maintenance processes on the record. Another necessary future step 
will be to compare these processes with other widely-assumed maintenance-
enhancement processes (e.g., verbal rehearsal, retrieval) that were not addressed 
explicitly in this exercise, but that may also serve to constrain how we believe 
maintenance occurs and how a model of working memory optimally describes 
maintenance. The precision we generate with these conversations clarifies which 
discussions transcend mere semantic disagreement, pointing out which controversies 
are most worthwhile to resolve. 
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